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Parallel imports (PI) are goods brought legally into a market without the authorization of the local
intellectual property rights (IPR) owner. Whether governments should allow PI liberally or not has been
a subject of great debate. In this paper, we argue that full-scale liberalization of PI hurts international
competition and should not be allowed. Instead, we argue that national/regional IPR exhaustion within
countries or groups of countries with similar demand characteristics, while sustaining price
differentiation across groups with different demand characteristics, may be the optimal global policy on
PI activities. Our arguments are based on Resource Advantage (R-A) theory.

The authors are thankful to Dr. Shelby D. Hunt, Dr. Dale E. Duhan, and Matthew R. Hedlund for their
valuable insights and feedback on the earlier version of this paper.

INTRODUCTION
Parallel imports, also called gray market imports, are genuine goods produced under the protection of
intellectual property rights (IPRs), sold into one market, and then brought legally into another market
without the authorization of the local intellectual property rights (IPR) owner (Maskus, 2010). For
instance, M-Tech Data Ltd., a UK-based retailer, imported 64 new Sun Microsystems computer disk
drives from a U.S. retailer and sold them to a customer in the UK. These disk drives were originally
supplied by Sun for purchasers in China, Chile, and the United States. M-Tech Data Ltd. did not seek the
authorization of Sun when importing the goods from a U.S. retailer into the UK (UK Supreme court,
2010). Parallel imports, also called gray market goods, are widespread across many industries. Parallel
import goods can include automobiles, books, video games, pharmaceuticals, consumer durable and nondurable goods, etc. (Ahmadi & Yang, 2000). Goods worth billions of dollars are placed in gray markets
which directly result in substantial losses to companies. For instance, the parallel import activity in
pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom was valued at one billion Euros in the United Kingdom alone
(Kanavos & Holmes, 2005). Also, parallel import activity in the information technology industry in the
United States has grown from $40 billion in sales and $5 billion in lost profits in 2002 to $58 billion in
sales and $10 billion in lost profits in 2008 ( KPMG, 2008). While parallel trade has negatively impacted
manufacturers, proponents of parallel trade point to the beneficial effects for the end consumers in that the
goods become accessible at inexpensive prices.
Parallel import is essentially an arbitrage of IPR protected goods (Maskus, 2010). For instance, Bayer
sells the drug ciprofloxacin for $740 (U.S. dollars) per 100 units in Mozambique, while the same drug is
sold in India for $15 because of local generic competition. Such price differentials offer motivation to
import the product from India without Bayer’s consent (WHO, 2014). Most goods incorporate a complex
mix of numerous IPRs such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks to support their global distribution.
IPRs provide protection to their owners, encourage the creation and development of new technologies and
products, enable IPR owners to monitor marketing activities, and enforce product quality (Maskus, 2010).
For this reason, IPR owners are granted with exclusive production and distribution rights, which help
them collect economic returns on their R&D investments. Therefore, IPR owners may find their profit
diminished by the ability of parallel imports to interfere with price differentials, maintaining vertical
control, and limiting licensing revenues (Maskus, 2000).
The most important limitation on the scope of IPR is the exhaustion doctrine, which states that at
some point the IPR holder loses its exclusive distribution rights (Maskus, 2000). For example, in the
United States and the European Union, first-sale doctrine indicates that distribution rights are exhausted
upon the first sale anywhere in the U.S. (national exhaustion) and in the territory of the EU (regional
exhaustion). Once IPRs are exhausted, it becomes legal for anyone to sell the goods purchased within the
territory. However, both the U.S. and the EU prohibit imports of such goods from outside their territories.
Though there are different practices when it comes to exhaustion doctrine, developing economies
generally have a more open regime and, therefore, are more inclined toward allowing parallel imports
(called PI hereafter) in all fields of IPR (e.g., copyrights, patents, trademarks) than are developed
economies. This difference comes from the reasoning that competition from PI could force distributors to
charge lower prices, and the resultant low prices benefit consumers of developing nations.
On the other hand, IPR owners have a strong incentive to sell their protected goods at different prices
to different types of customers. Different markets represent different demand elasticity (changes in
demand with respect to changes in many economic variables); and, given these differences in demand,
firms prefer to differentiate their prices across different markets to increase their total return of
investments. This environment creates opportunities for parallel importers to import from low-priced
markets and sell in high-priced markets bypassing the authorized distribution channels as long as the costs
of procuring and shipping (trade costs) do not exceed the price differentials between markets. Therefore,
PI are essentially an arbitrage of IPR protected goods across markets regulated by different PI-related
policies; and, they limit the scope for international price discrimination (Malueg & Schwartz, 1994). For
example, pharmaceutical firms in developed economies that agreed to provide many essential drugs at

low cost in Sub-Saharan African nations are concerned that these drugs might be sold into higher-price
markets through parallel export channels in Korea, Japan, and other nations (Maskus, 2000).
PI affect firm profits in many ways. They not only limit the scope for international price differentials
but also make the distribution of goods inefficient because the costly trade of managing both legitimate
and illegitimate distribution channels replaces more cost-efficient local distribution dealing with just
authorized supply chains (Maskus, 2010). Reduced profits eventually diminish firms’ R&D incentives.
Therefore, regulation of PI has become a critical issue in the global trading system.
Because PI activities are damaging to manufacturers and perceived to be beneficial to consumers,
there is a great debate about allowing PI. Proponents of PI argue that liberalization of PI will integrate
markets, strengthen competition, and reduce prices for consumers. They also argue that a ban against PI
could confer considerably greater market power on IPR owners, supporting their higher monopolistic
prices in particular markets (e.g., Abbott, 1998). On the other hand, some analysts advocate a global ban
against PI by arguing that it is a natural extension of the rights of IPR owners to control international
distribution. Simply, allowing PI creates many hurdles for IPR owners which affect their ability to set
separate prices that capture the economic valuation of specific consumers (Barfield & Groombridge,
1998). For instance, profits from PI go to unauthorized distribution channel members. Authorized channel
members suffer a reduction in sales and profits creating disruption in relations between IPR owners and
their authorized suppliers. Further, when genuine products are sold at a steep discount in a market, the
brand image suffers (Myers & Griffith, 1999). It is also argued that IPRs are forms of knowledge capital,
and they have been the key determinant of long run growth in national economies (Nelson & Romer,
1996). Hence, protection of IPRs and enhanced economic performance are strongly interconnected (Bale,
1998; Barfield & Groombridge, 1998).
The root of the debate, regarding a global ban versus full liberalization of PI, stems from the
fundamental principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is the prohibition of tariff and all
other trade barriers to support the free movement of goods and services across and within the boundaries
of member countries. Thus, restraints against PI constitute non-tariff barriers to international trade and are
inconsistent with the fundamental principle of WTO (Abbott, 1998). Relatedly, advocates of PI support
the idea that any vertical arrangements and market segmentation-based price differentiations to control PI
have monopolistic purposes and artificially raise prices. The fundamental principle of WTO – free
movement of goods and services – has this underlying belief that specialization and free trade will benefit
all the trading partners in the long term. Therefore, any system that prevents PI does not comport with this
belief. At the same time, the differences in perceived consumer interests make it difficult to achieve
international agreements on exhaustion (Maskus, 2000). It almost proved impossible in WTO’s trade
negotiations to reach a global consensus on whether to ban or liberalize PI activities.
Our contribution through this paper is as follows. We show that, (1) assumptions behind the
arguments made by both proponents and opponents of PI activity are inconsistent with the reality of
international trade. Both sides assume that markets operate under the conditions of perfect competition. In
reality, PI happen in markets with imperfect competition because imperfect competition is the result of
firms maintaining pricing power and price differentiation schemes (Conley, 2008). Thereby, PI, in most
conditions, are at odds with the WTO’s free trade argument, (2) Based on the R-A theory of competition,
we support the national/regional IPR exhaustion on PI. We argue that national/regional IPR exhaustion
within countries or groups of countries with similar demand characteristics and low transport costs, while
sustaining price differentiation across groups with different demand characteristics, may be the optimal
global policy on PI activities. There are reasons to believe that price differentials, market segmentation,
vertical price controls, and protecting IPRs to encourage firms’ R&D investments in competitive markets
can be beneficial overall. Further, we argue that full liberalization of PI harms the economic growth of
nations, and is detrimental to global welfare in the long term. Therefore, our analysis is a departure from
just the pro-parallel trade versus the anti-parallel trade debate and is rooted in sound theory.
The paper is organized as follows. We first briefly review the debate over PI by using two schools of
thought in competition policies. Second, we provide an overview of the Resource-Advantage (R-A)
theory. Third, based on R-A theory, we discuss why full liberalization of PI harms the economic growth

of nations in the long term, and how regional IPR exhaustion can be an optimal global policy. Finally, we
discuss the implications for public policy and conclude that regional IPR exhaustion regime may promote
social welfare at a global scale.
PARALLEL IMPORTS DEBATE
In the broadest international legal terms, the debate over liberalization of PI at a global scale stems
from the question of:
“To what extent should the IPR holders within particular territories be entitled to restrict the
importation of products into those territories on the basis of local IPR ownership when those
products have been placed on the market outside the territory with their consent?” (Abbott 1998,
p. 607)
This question considers the global trade term - exhaustion, which is the territorial right of the IPR
owners after the first sale of protected goods and services. The ability of IPR owners to exclude PI legally
from a particular market depends on the importing nation’s treatment of exhaustion of IPRs. There are
two general territorial exhaustion regimes: (1) national/regional and (2) international. National/regional
exhaustion regime awards the right to prevent PI, which means the IPR owners have the right to block the
importation or sale of the protected product in domestic markets. However, they cannot prevent the
subsequent resale of the product after the owner has exhausted the right of the first sale in domestic
markets. On the other hand, according to the international exhaustion regime, the owner loses the
exclusive privilege after the first sale of the product anywhere in the world, and PI become legal. In
specific terms, there are two PI practices based on international exhaustion theory. Passive PI is when
patented products are purchased in a foreign market and resold in the domestic markets. Active PI occurs
when a foreign licensee exploits the patent then enters the domestic market in direct competition with the
owner and other official domestic licensees (Fink, 2004). Both cases lead to intense intra-brand
competition, which is the prime factor behind the heated debate around liberalization of PI around the
globe. For a detailed discussion and examples on exhaustion policies, please see the following table.
TABLE 1
PARALLEL TRADE POLICIES
Parallel
Trade
Policy

Example
What is permitted by the What is not permitted by the policy?
countries
policy?
implement
ing these
policies

National
exhaustion

United
States
of
America,
Canada

Distribution rights are
exhausted upon first sale
anywhere in the country.
Once IPRs are exhausted, it
becomes legal for anyone to
sell the goods purchased
within the country.

Countries that adopt this regime have the right to
prohibit imports of such goods from outside of their
territories.

For example, if a company X has a patent in the U.S.
and sells its product to a customer in China, X’s rights
outside of the U.S. are not exhausted. X can prohibit
efforts by the Chinese buyer to import the same
For example, if a company product in the U.S.
X has a patent in the U.S.
and sells its product to a
customer in the U.S., X’s

Regional
exhaustion

European
Union

rights are exhausted within
the U.S. The buyer can
resell the product anywhere
within the U.S.
Distribution rights are
exhausted upon first sale
anywhere in the region.
Once IPRs are exhausted, it
becomes legal for anyone to
sell the goods purchased
within the region.

A region that adopts this regime has the right to
prohibit imports of such goods from outside the
region.

For example, if a company X has a patent in a country
in the European Union and sells its product to a
customer in China, X’s rights outside of the E.U. are
not exhausted. X can prohibit efforts by the Chinese
For example, if a company buyer to import the same product in the E.U.
X has a patent in a country
in the European Union, say
Germany, and sells its
product to a customer in
another
EU
member
country, say Italy, X’s
rights are exhausted within
the E.U. The buyer in Italy
can resell the product
anywhere within the E.U.

Internationa
l exhaustion

Russia,
China,
South
Africa,
India, and
most of the
developing
countries

IPR owners lose the
exclusive privilege after the
first sale of the product
anywhere in the world, and
PI goods become legal.
For example, if a company
X has a patent in the U.S.
and sells its product to a
customer in Japan, X’s
rights
are
exhausted
anywhere in the world. The
buyer in Japan can freely
resell the product anywhere
in the world.

The existence of PI raises a number of interesting policy and strategic questions that have attracted
the attention of economists and policy makers. The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the main focus of the extensive debate
over the liberalization of PI. American negotiators in the Uruguay Round attempted to incorporate a
global standard of national exhaustion into the agreement on TRIPS. However, it was not possible to
reach such an agreement because of the divergent views on the net benefits of PI (Maskus, 2000). The
well-known Article #6 states that

“[f]or the purposes of dispute settlement under [TRIPS], subject to the provisions of Articles 3
and 4 above, nothing in [TRIPS] shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.”
The final status of the TRIPS agreement preserves the territorial prerogative to regulate PI, which
means it implicitly leaves the decision on whether or not to recognize the international exhaustion of IPRs
to each member state. This flexibility gained popularity especially in developing countries.
WTO is the only organization that handles the dispute settlement regarding international trade issues.
Article #6 of the TRIPS agreement permits each country to establish its own rules on exhaustion, and its
decision may not be challenged under the WTO dispute settlement. That means, the PI issue is unresolved
and there is no organization that can provide a global policy for the regulation of PI. For example, the
United States (U.S.) adopts a mixture of regimes. It pursues the national exhaustion policy for
copyrighted and patented products, thereby, allowing the IPR holders to restrict PI from abroad.
However, the U.S. adopts international exhaustion in trademarked goods and services and allows their PI.
The European Union (EU) adopts regional exhaustion in all fields of intellectual propertry rights within
its member countries. According to Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome, free circulation of products and
services should take precedence over IPRs (Maskus, 2000). The basic motivation for adopting this regime
by the EU is to encourage regional market integration (Li & Maskus, 2006). Finally, international
exhaustion is a general policy in developing nations. However, some developed nations such as Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand have recently decided to move toward a more liberal treatment of PI. In May
1998, the New Zealand government accepted international exhaustion regime for the PI of copyrighted
goods due to the high prices of compact discs and books (Maskus, 2000). Although music companies
recognized that this decision would significantly impair their market segmentation and pricing policies,
the New Zealand government argued that acceptance of international exhaustion in copyrighted goods
would reduce the prices of consumer goods without disrupting the creative process, and thereby, increase
the consumer welfare in the long-term. After this decision, New Zealand was included in the U.S. Special
301 watch list.
Recently, the Russian government announced that its ban on PI would be removed by 2020. They
currently apply national exhaustion for trademark rights, and by 2020 they will be adopting the doctrine
of international exhaustion. In this specific case, the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) insists
that liberalization of PI will strengthen competition, while the ban is an abuse of the dominant position of
the trademark owner. On the other hand, the Association of European Businesses (AEB) is trying to
persuade the Russian government not to allow PI, arguing it will drive investors away from the local
market in addition to increasing the flow of counterfeit products. Prior to the revision of Patent Law,
China largely ignored the issue of PI. China’s Trademark Law, Copyright Law, Anti-Unfair Competition
Law, Foreign Trade Law, and Customs Law do not explicitly deal with PI. Only the revised Patent Law in
2009 has some policies on PI. The Chinese Patent Law follows the international exhaustion doctrine and
permits PI (Si & Wang, 2011; Guizhen, 2011).
Since the issue is currently unresolved, it may be insightful to discuss the foundations on which both
sides build their arguments. Proponents of PI reflect the monopoly school of economic thought (Barfield
& Groombridge, 1998). This school of thought argues, briefly, that vertical restraints and any attempts to
control supply chain through vertical arrangements are monopolistic moves intended to artificially
segment the markets and raise consumer prices (e.g., abusive price discrimination). This school of thought
argues that prevention of PI is a non-tariff barrier to global trade and that it is inconsistent with the
fundamental principle of the WTO -- the integration of markets (Abbott, 1998). According to this view,
the world should be treated as one uniform market, and the exercise of patent rights, market segmentation,
and artificial price discrimination will lessen consumer welfare in the long term. By arguing for the
liberalization of PI, proponents hope to prevent wealth transfer that results from a monopoly.
On the other hand, the efficiency school of thought believes that vertical arrangements reduce costs
by increasing allocative efficiency (Bork, 1978; Tesler, 1960). Multinational firms expand their markets

through establishing exclusive dealership rights in various territories. These rights assure that
multinational firms monitor their marketing efforts and enforce product quality, which results in increased
customer benefits and satisfaction (Maskus, 2000). Further, they believe that allowing vertical
arrangements is an indispensable means of competing on the basis of regionally distinct marketing
components, and, therefore, becomes a decisive factor in international competition. Briefly, full
restriction against PI is a necessary complement to exclusive territorial rights (Chard & Mellor, 1989).
We argue here that in the long run, both full liberalization of and the global ban on PI activities harm
international competition and lessen social welfare. Both the monopoly and the efficiency schools base
their assumptions on perfect competition and support the neo-classical, equilibrium-based research
tradition. We believe that both approaches to PI are misguided. Instead, we suggest that the debate over PI
should move beyond the neo-classical, equilibrium-based research tradition. We suggest that the
evolutionary, disequilibrium provoking, and process theory of competition provides a more useful
theoretical basis for a meaningful debate. With this commentary in mind, we present a brief overview of a
process-based theory of competition, Resource Advantage theory of competition, in the next section.
RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE THEORY OF COMPETITION
At the heart of the discussion over restricting PI is one of the most debated questions in the field of
business/economics:
Why do firms replace market exchange, where the world is one uniform market and all consumers
have access to the one uniform price, with a more complex form of market exchange processes
such as vertical integration, contractual relationships, territoriality, segmented markets, and
price differentiation? (Barfield & Groombridge, 1998; Williamson, 1985).
Are vertical integration and market segmentation strategies pro-competitive or anticompetitive? Are
they good or bad for society’s welfare in the long-term? Answering these questions requires exploring the
role of these strategies in market-based economies in which privately owned companies compete with
each other. It also requires understanding how moderate restrictions on PI influence both society’s
welfare and how firms compete. Our foundation for exploring these questions is the Resource-Advantage
theory (hereafter, R-A theory) of competition. This theory is being developed in economics (Hunt, 1997),
general business (O’Keeffe, Mavondo, & Schroder, 1998), management (Hunt, 1995; Hunt & Lambe,
2000), and marketing (Hunt & Morgan, 1995, 1997; Hunt & Arnett, 2001, 2004). Figure 1 displays the
dynamic nature of R-A competition; Figure 2 shows the competitive position matrix; and Table 2
provides the foundational propositions of R-A theory. Our overview of R-A theory will closely follow the
theory’s treatment in Hunt (2000).
The Pedigree and Structure of R-A Theory
As an interdisciplinary theory of competition, R-A theory shares affinities with diverse theories,
research programs, and traditions, such as evolutionary economics, Austrian economics, heterogeneous
demand theory, differential advantage theory, resource-based theory, competence based theory, and
socio-economics and institutional theory. Here, we briefly review the influence of each of these. First, RA theory traces to evolutionary economics, which maintains that competition is a process that provokes
disequilibrium (Dosi & Nelson, 1994). Competitive processes bring creative destruction and accelerate
economic growth and productivity. Technological progress created by competition is what propels gains
in real per capita income and long-term economic growth (Schumpeter, 1942). Second, Austrian
economics views competition as a knowledge discovery process, which means that firms learn through
competition as a result of feedback from their financial performance (Misses, 1920). Third, heterogeneous
demand theory argues that demand in the overwhelming majority of industries is substantially
heterogeneous and dynamic; therefore, consumers’ tastes and preferences differ greatly within the same

product category and are always changing (Alderson, 1965; Chamberlin, 1962). Fourth, differential
advantage theory asserts that competition is dynamic and firms struggle with each other for competitive
advantages. Firms can either have an efficiency advantage (reducing costs while providing equivalent
benefits) or an effectiveness advantage (producing more benefits) or both (more efficiently producing
more benefits) (Alderson, 1965; Clark, 1961; Porter, 1985). Fifth, resource-based theory views resources
as tangible and intangible entities that enable firms to produce market offerings which have value for
some market segment(s). Further, it asserts that successful firms that are able to sustain their performance
have not only heterogeneous resources, but also resources that cannot be duplicated or imitated precisely
by competitor firms (Barney, 1991; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Sixth, competence-based theory explains
how firms develop strategies to effectively and efficiently deploy resources. This theory argues that
competition is a continuous dynamic process with the goal of superior financial performance as the major
driver of the dynamic nature of competition. Since all competing firms cannot be simultaneously superior
in financial performance, competition among firms stimulates both proactive and reactive innovations
(Day & Nedungandi, 1994; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Finally, institutional theory recognizes that societal
institutions can be independent variables in the analyses of competition that can cause changes in
economic outcomes (Etzioni, 1988; Uzzi, 1996). Thereby, they can influence the process of competition,
productivity, and economic growth. Indeed, societal institutions are one of the main facilitators of
competition induced economic growth.
R-A theory draws from and shares affinities with several research traditions and theories. However, it
is not simply a composite of these theories; it draws only on those aspects of the research traditions that
fit together. R-A theory views competition as a disequilibrium provoking, evolutionary, and never-ending
process. It views (1) both innovation and organizational learning as natural outcomes of the process of
competition, (2) firms and consumers as having costly and imperfect information, and (3) macroenvironmental factors (e.g., institutions, public policy, customers, suppliers, competitors) as affecting
economic performance.
In R-A theory, firms and their resources are the hereditary units of evolutionary selection, and it is the
process of competition that selects firms and resources. R-A theory defines the process of competition as
“the constant struggle among firms for comparative advantages in resources that will yield marketplace
positions of competitive advantage for some market segment(s) and, thereby, superior financial
performance” (Hunt, 2000, p. 135). As shown in Figure 1, R-A theory emphasizes the importance of
comparative advantages/disadvantages in resources, and the respective marketplace positions of
competitive advantages/disadvantages. R-A theory’s treatment of resources will be one of the
foundational arguments that we use to defend the regional exhaustion regime on PI in global markets. As
shown in Figure 2, R-A theory emphasizes the importance of firms’ market segments due to differences
in consumers’ tastes and preferences. Again, R-A theory’s treatment of market segmentation and price
differentials will be another core argument in defending why regional exhaustion regime on PI is procompetitive in global markets. In our argument, we will also use some of the foundational premises of RA theory (Table 2).
TABLE 2
FOUNDATIONAL PROPOSITIONS OF RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE THEORY

P1. Demand is
P2. Consumer information is
P3: Human motivation is
P4: The firm’s objective is
P5: The firm’s information is

Resource-Advantage theory
Heterogeneous across industries, heterogeneous
within industries, and dynamic
Imperfect and costly
Constrained self-interest seeking
Superior financial performance
Imperfect and costly

P6: The firm’s resources are

Financial, physical, legal, human, organizational,
informational, and relational.
Heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile
To recognize, understand, create, select,
implement, and modify strategies
Disequilibrium
provoking
with
innovation
endogenous.

P7: Resource characteristics are
P8: The role of management is
P9: Competitive dynamics are
Source: Adapted from Hunt (2000).

FIGURE 1
A SCHEMATIC OF RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE THEORY OF COMPETITION

Societal Resources

Resources
• Comparative Advantage
• Parity
• Comparative Disadvantage

Competitors -Suppliers

Societal Institutions

Market Position
• Competitive Advanta ge
• Parity
• Competitive Disadvantage

Consumers

Fina ncial Performance
• Superior
• Parity
• Inferior

Public Policy

Read: Competition is the disequilibrating, ongoing process that consists of the constant struggle among firms for a comparative
and, thereby, superior financial performance
advantage in resources that will yield a marketplace position of competitive advantage
Firms learn through competition as a result of feedback from relative financial performance “signaling” relative market position, which,
in turn signals relative resources.
Source: Adapted from Hunt and Morgan (1997)

FIGURE 2
COMPETITIVE POSITION MATRIX
Segment
D
Segment
D
Segment
D
Segment
D
Segment
1D
2D
3D
SegmentDD
1C
2C
3C
Segment C
1B
2B
3B
Intermediate
Competitive
Competitive
Segment B
Intermediate
Competitive
Competitive
Position
Advantage
Advantage
1A
2A
3A
Segment A
Position
Intermediate
Advantage
Competitive
Advantage
Competitive
Position
Advantage
Advantage
Indeterminate
Competitive
Competitive
Lower
4D
5A
6A
Position
Advantage
Advantage
4C
5A
6A
Competitive
4B
Parity
5A
Competitive
6A
Competitive
Parity
Competitive
Disadvantage
Position
Advantage
4A
5A
6A
Disadvantage
Competitive
Position
Parity
Advantage
Competitive
Disadvantage
Position
Advantage
Competitive
Parity
Competitive
7D
8A
9A
Disadvantage
Position
Advantage
7C
8A
9A
7B
8A
9A
Competitive
Competitive
Intermediate
Competitive
Competitive
Intermediate
Disadvantage
Disadvantage
Position
7A
8A
9A
Disadvantage
Competitive
Disadvantage
Competitive
Position
Intermediate
Disadvantage
Disadvantage
Competitive
Competitive
Disadvantage
Disadvantage

Lower

Parity

Position
Indeterminate
Position

Parity

Relative
Resource
Cost
(Efficiency)

Higher

Superior

Relative Resource-Produced Value
(Effectiveness)

Read: The marketplace position of competitive advantage identified as Cell 3A in each segment results from the
firm, relative to its competitors, having a resource assortment that enables it to produce an offering that (a) is
perceived to be of superior value by consumers in that segment and (b) is produced at lower costs than those of
rivals. * Each competitive position matrix constitutes a different market segment (denoted as segment A, segment B,
…).

Source: Adapted from Hunt & Morgan (1997).
R-A theory views firms as combiners of heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile resources, under
conditions of costly and imperfect information, with the primary objective of superior financial
performance. Due to the heterogeneity and immobility of resources, R-A theory focuses on comparative
advantages in resources among organizations. Some firms will have comparative advantages in resources
that are available to them, which enable them to effectively and efficiently produce particular market
offering(s) that have value for particular market segment(s). As shown in Figures 1 and 2, when firms
have comparative advantages/disadvantages in resources, they can occupy marketplace positions of
competitive advantage/disadvantage that will result in superior/inferior financial performance.
Furthermore, the extent to which the process of competition fosters productivity and economic growth is
significantly influenced by several environmental factors (e.g., societal resources, societal institutions,
competitors and suppliers, consumers, and public policy decisions). Figure 2 displays nine possible
competitive marketplace positions based on two dimensions and three levels for each dimension.
Depending on the level of a firm’s relative resource-produced value for some segments and its level of
relative resource costs for producing such value, it will either occupy an advantageous, disadvantageous,
or an indeterminate position, which would in turn affect its financial position (e.g., superior, inferior,
parity). Specifically, a “marketplace positional advantage” means that a firm is occupying one of three
cells (cell 2, 3, or 6). In the next section, we will explain how a process view of competition, the R-A
theory, could provide a meaningful theoretical foundation for the active debate on PI.
THE PARALLEL IMPORT DEBATE AND RESOURCE-ADVANTAGE (R-A) THEORY
We argue that regional exhaustion regime on unauthorized imports in the exercise of IPRs are, under
most conditions, pro-competitive. R-A theory is the foundation for this view and provides supportive
argument for this case in the following two sections: (1) price differentials and vertical price controls are
pro-competitive and part of dynamic competition, and (2) IPRs represent a financial, informational, and
legal resource; and they are the cornerstone of dynamic competition. Therefore, protecting them is
essential in global competition and in building strong global economies.

Market Segmentation and R-A Theory
Proponents of the liberalization of parallel trade around the globe majorly subscribe to the monopoly
school of thought and defend neo-classical, static equilibrium economics. They argue that IP owners use
their rights to artificially segment the markets and charge different prices (Abbott, 1998; Chen, 2002). In
this case, the practice of using price differentials is viewed as anti-competitive in that it permits firms to
set prices according to each country’s market power. This market power is sustained by restrictions
against parallel trade, and such restrictions act as non-tariff barriers to trade in goods involved in PI.
Supporters of this view believe that to the extent that market segmentation promotes collusive pricing
behavior, restricting PI serves as a facilitating device for firms to charge differential prices (Maskus,
2000).
In neo-classical economics, all market offerings are treated as commodities and are “regarded for
practical purposes as homogenous within [themselves]” (Robinson, 1933, p.17). It means that consumers’
needs, wants, tastes, and preferences are assumed to be alike (homogenous). It also assumes that there is
a single demand curve, a single supply curve, and common elasticity of demand (willingness to pay) for
each commodity. Therefore, any activity (e.g., market segmentation) that treats consumers differently and
fractures markets into artificial segments is detrimental to society and results in welfare losses (Stigler,
1982). Further, the monopolistic school of thought argues that consumers in high-price markets will
benefit from PI because unauthorized distribution outlets would import the same goods being offered by
the authorized distributors, creating intra-brand competition by lowering the prices. Eventually, the
dynamics of this competition would threaten the distributors and motivate them to lower the overall prices
(Barfield & Groombridge, 1998). In this case, parallel trade seems to be a competitive mechanism that
would eliminate any price differentials and force firms to set uniform prices.
In contrast, other researchers argue that demand heterogeneity is a market reality, and price
differentials in segmented markets happen according to demand elasticity (Alderson, 1965; Chamberlin,
1962; Hunt & Arnett, 2004; Smith, 1956). Smith (1956, p.6), in what is considered a seminal article in
marketing, argued, “market segmentation may be regarded as a force in the market that will not be
denied.” As Sawhney (1998, p.54) points out “customers are becoming very sophisticated and are
demanding customized products and services to match individual preferences and tastes.” There will
always be customers who are willing to pay higher prices for higher quality products; and, there will
always be customers who would prefer to save money by accepting less quality. From this perspective,
firms using market segmentation and price differentiation strategies are not necessarily conducting
abusive price discrimination. They are just following the nature of dynamic market structure.
In most of the circumstances, when firm profits are higher, they have a greater ability to engage in
price differentiation across different international markets (Krugman, 1986). However, contrary to the
monopolistic school of thought, profits are not the only component of economic well-being. The overall
impacts on a society’s welfare are typically more ambiguous (Maskus, 2010). As Maskus (2000) notes,
economic theory has long noted that price discrimination can provide positive economic benefits to
society. Under a regime of price differentials, in comparison to a regime of uniform pricing, social
welfare increases. Specifically, firms can supply more consumers with lower valuations for a product
while extracting additional surplus from consumers with higher valuations. In this way, companies open
new markets in countries with low marginal valuation, and, in doing so, both consumer and producer
surplus rise. Further, empirical evidence shows that in the presence of parallel trade, IPR owners may
choose not to sell in lower valuation countries because local demand could be insufficient under uniform
pricing (Malueg & Schwartz, 1994). Therefore, ignoring the fact that there are distinct groups of
consumers whose demands for the product differ in price elasticity invites strategic failures.
In this sense, R-A theory of competition provides a theoretical foundation for market segmentation
strategy, contributes to explaining why such a strategy is required for economic growth, and explains why
full liberalization of PI is detrimental in this process. Proposition 1 (in Table 2) agrees that demand in the
overwhelming majority of industries is substantially heterogeneous and characterized by differential
consumer tastes, preferences, and use requirements (Hunt & Arnett, 2004). In order to satisfy those
different needs, firms should provide customized market offerings to each segment. Therefore, they have

to possess a bundle of unique resources to serve different markets. In this sense, as shown in Figure 1, RA theory sees competition as a constant struggle among firms for comparative advantage in resources that
will yield marketplace positions of competitive advantage for some market segment(s) and, thereby,
superior financial performance. Briefly, R-A theory views market segmentation as a basic unit of
competition. Figure 2 shows that there are two important factors that determine the competitive position
of firms in different market segments: (1) consumer perceptions regarding the value of the market
offerings relative to those of competitors, and (2) the relative cost of the resources that are required to
produce the market offerings. Simply, R-A theory agrees that if a market is substantially heterogeneous,
treating consumers’ needs in that market uniformly will be detrimental to competition and social welfare.
For example, in most cases, price differentiation allows firms to open new markets with low marginal
valuation. In this way, consumers of poor countries are more likely to find the products in their markets
than otherwise. This strategy would not be viable if the firms were forced to charge a uniform price. Thus,
consistent with R-A theory, market segmentation and price differentiation may generate greater social
welfare gains than are available under a uniform price – with the addition of more markets, consumer and
producer surplus rise (Markus, 2010).
One of the central arguments of the monopolistic school of thought regarding restricting PI assumes
that the world is one market, demand is uniform, and anything that differentiates markets results in
discriminatory pricing and is anti-competitive. On the contrary, as a dynamic theory of competition, R-A
theory argues that demand is substantially heterogeneous in many industries and treating demand as
uniform (e.g., allowing PI) will harm not only the competition among firms, but also firms’ motivation
for creativity and innovation, which are the driving forces of strong global economies.
Although there have been few empirical studies which directly analyzed the welfare tradeoffs of
restricting PI, one study from Schmalensee (1981) supported the hypothesis that price differentials can
increase the total welfare if the total consumption of goods increases. Similarly, a study by Malueg and
Schwartz (1994) provides empirical support for the impact of price differentials on global welfare. They
present a model, which includes many countries, and compare the impact of two global pricing scenarios:
(1) a uniform price across all the markets, and (2) a mixed regime with uniform prices in subsets of
similar markets and price differences among groups of markets. They find that a mixed regime with
uniform prices within groups of markets and price differentiation across these groups offers the highest
social welfare possibilities. They state that
“If parallel imports are prevented…firms could offer lower prices to lower income (more elastic)
countries without fear of the products resurfacing in high markets. Absent such…segmentation,
firms may well choose relatively high uniform prices, at which low-demand countries are likely
to go unserved.” And, they conclude that (p.20) “…our analysis casts doubt on the view that
world welfare would be enhanced by encouraging unrestricted parallel imports in order to prevent
price discrimination.”
Briefly, the small, least developed countries would almost certainly not be served by original
manufacturers were there a globally uniform price. In this case, the main beneficiaries of uniform pricing
would be the consumers in high-income countries.
R-A theory provides a theoretical foundation for the success of market segmentation and price
differential strategy. Based on its proposition #1, R-A theory argues that parallel trade could be beneficial
among countries with similar demand structures, but would be harmful across nations with different
demand patterns. In this case, permitting parallel trade may raise welfare within regional trade agreements
(e.g., EU, NAFTA, preferential trading arrangements- PTA) where the demand structure is similar and
transportation costs are low.
Intellectual Properties Are Resources
One of the essential requirements for a theory of competition to explain and predict why IPRs are
essential in global competition and social welfare is that the theory must be capable of providing

reasoning for their unique, heterogeneous, and imperfect mobility resource nature. This is precisely what - as an interdisciplinary, integrative theory of competition -- R-A theory does. Our reasoning follows.
Consistent with the resource-based view of the firm, R-A theory broadens the concept of resources.
Resources are defined as tangible and intangible entities available to the firm that enable it to produce
efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has value for some market segment(s). As shown in
Table 2, R-A theory categorizes resources as financial (e.g., cash reserves and access to financial
markets), physical (e.g., plant, raw materials, and equipment), legal (e.g., trademarks and licenses),
human (e.g., the skills and knowledge of individual employees), organizational (e.g., controls, routines,
cultures, and competences), informational (e.g., knowledge about market segments, competitors, and
technology), and relational (e.g., relationships with competitors, suppliers, and customers). Under R-A
theory, IPRs are resources only if they contribute to the firm’s ability to produce a market offering of
value for some market segment(s). That is, IPRs must be perceived as “value add” to the market offering
by the market segment(s). As to the R-A theory’s resource categories, IPRs may be considered as
financial, informational, and legal resources.
First, IPRs are financial resources because they provide firms with rights to prevent imitation of their
innovations for a limited period of time. Rights conferred give the IPR owners the exclusive right to
make, use, and sell the protected invention including the exclusive right to import the invention, which
help firms garner economic returns on their R&D investments. By its very nature, PI interferes with IPR
owners’ rights for discriminatory price setting and limits their licensing revenues. Today, global trade
growth is increasingly driven by innovation in industries substantially dependent on IPRs for their
financial performance and growth. The pharmaceutical industry is one of them. Developing new drugs
involves substantial investments in R&D and accounts for approximately 30 percent of total costs for U.S.
pharmaceutical firms (Danzon, 1997). PI eliminates price differences, and therefore, would cause prices
to converge in the long term. Converging prices leads to marginal cost pricing, which is the price equal to,
or in some cases below the marginal cost of production. If prices were set equal to marginal cost to give
patients access to existing drugs at a reasonable cost, pharmaceutical firms would not be able to recoup
their investments and the incentives for R&D would disappear. In the long run, with marginal cost
pricing, too little investment in R&D results in too few drugs being developed. To correct this market
imperfection, IPRs exist to allow companies to exercise some market power in order to recover their
R&D investments (Maskus, 2000). IPRs, as financial resources, motivate firms to create new products
and business models that change their competitive position in global competition.
Second, IPRs are informational resources because, according to the R-A theory of competition,
consumers have imperfect information and searching for information is costly (Proposition 2 in Table 2).
Therefore, consumers generally use trademarks and copyrights as heuristics of product/service quality
(Erdem & Swait, 1998). That is, trademarks and copyrights are valuable sources of information to
consumers. PI goods are identical to legitimate products except that they may be packaged differently and
may not carry the original manufacturer’s warranty and after-sale rights; therefore, they are highly likely
to create dilution among existing and potential customers. Authorized distributors have the incentive to
advertise and promote the new products. They incur costs of building territorial markets through pre- and
post-sale marketing activities. These costs are generally likely to be quite significant (Rapp & Rozek,
1992). On the other hand, parallel importers - unauthorized distributors - simply buy the goods abroad
without incurring similar marketing costs (e.g., free riding). Since the parallel import goods are meant for
other markets, consumers in the imported market will be exposed to the same legitimate brand with two
different presentations and will more likely question the equivalence and quality of these new products.
Finally, IPRs are legal resources because intellectual property laws prevent rival firms from imitating
and infringing on IPR holders’ knowledge capital (Grossman & Helpman, 1990), and stealing the value of
their investment in developing their brands’ equity (Hunt, 2006). For example, the WTO agreement on
TRIPS represents a culmination of multilateral activity leading to global strengthening of national laws
and regulations providing firms with rights to prevent copying and infringing of their innovations for a
limited time period (Bale, 1998).

In summary, R-A theory argues that full-liberalization of PI will be detrimental to global competition
and social welfare in the long term. The theory’s fundamental premises view intra-industry demand as
substantially heterogeneous and market segmentation as a basic unit of competition. By means of its
treatment of resources, the theory also views IPRs as legal, informational, and financial resources that will
yield marketplace positions of competitive advantage for some market segment(s) and, thereby, superior
financial performance. Please find the summary of our discussion in the following table. Our
contributions are related to the content in columns 4 and 5.
TABLE 3
PARALLEL TRADE POLICIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THEORIES
Parallel
Trade
Policy

Monopoly
school of
thought
perspective –
pro-parallel
trade

Efficiency school of R-A theory
thought perspective perspective
– anti-parallel trade – adopted
by this
paper

Reasoning based on R-A theory

National
exhaustion

Argue against
national
exhaustion

Argue for national
exhaustion

(1) Demand heterogeneity is a market
reality and price differentials in
segmented markets happen according
to demand elasticity. Each
nation/region should be treated as
one market.

Argue for
national
exhaustion

(2) IPRs as legal, informational, and
financial resources will yield
marketplace positions of competitive
advantage for firms. Protecting them
from parallel imports in the global
markets will provide firms with
superior financial performance,
which will eventually increase their
R&D investments.

Regional
exhaustion

Argue against
regional
exhaustion

Argue against
regional exhaustion
based on low
transaction cost

Argue for
regional
exhaustion

(1) Demand heterogeneity is a market
reality and price differentials in
segmented markets happen
according to demand elasticity.
Each country or region with a
similar economic structure among
member countries should be treated
as one market.

(2) IPRs as legal, informational, and
financial resources will yield
marketplace positions of
competitive advantage for firms

and, thereby, superior financial
performance in global markets.
Regional exhaustion, if implemented well
by institutions, is useful for global welfare
in the long term.

International Argue for
exhaustion
international
exhaustion for
global
liberalization
of the trade.

Argue against
international
exhaustion based on
low transaction cost

Argue
(1)
against
international
exhaustion

If markets are treated uniformly,
assuming they have a single demand
curve, this move will reduce the
consumer welfare in the long term
because consumers’ tastes and
preferences are heterogeneous.

(2)

IPRs as legal, informational, and
financial resources will yield
marketplace positions of competitive
advantage for firms. Protecting them
from parallel imports in the global
markets will provide IPR owners
with superior financial performance,
which will eventually increase their
R&D investments.

Protection of IPRs in global markets is
essential today for invention, innovation,
and for the healthy expansion of the
global economic system.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Parallel imports (PI) command different views on both sides of the global policy debate. Advocates of
liberalization of PI point to the monopolistic structure of market segmentation strategy, vertical price
controls, and price differentials among markets. They argue that territoriality and vertical price integration
to control PI have monopolistic purposes; and, these controls are often viewed as anticompetitive in that
they allow IPR owners to set prices according to their market power in each territory. Therefore,
proponents see PI as an effective device for disciplining potential collusive practices among IPR owners.
They believe that restricting PI will artificially segment the markets, raise the prices, and harm the
consumer welfare in the long run. Therefore, they argue for the regime of international exhaustion as an
effective competition policy. However, evidence shows that international exhaustion regime will have a
significant negative impact on firms’ R&D initiatives at a global scale (Danzon, 1997).
On the other hand, enthusiasts who support IPRs view restrictions against PI to be natural extensions
of the rights to protect companies’ R&D incentives. They also strongly argue that protecting IPRs has a
positive social welfare effect in the long run. In this view, parallel trade is considered a competitive
mechanism that could drive retail prices to converge. This convergence increases the prices in low-price
regions, harming low-price consumers, and decreases the prices in high-price regions, benefitting highprice consumers. Besides, parallel trade wastes resources through transportation of goods and free-riding
of marketing expenses.

Using R-A theory as a foundation for understanding dynamic market systems, this paper has explored
the benefits that contribute greatly to global economic systems and social welfare when PI activities are
permitted on a national/regional basis. R-A theory stresses the importance of market segments, which are
defined as groups of consumers whose demand characteristics (e.g., tastes and preferences) with regard to
output are relatively homogenous. With its focus on market segments as basic units of competition, R-A
theory emphasizes firms’ superior financial performance results from developing market offerings that
match the needs of a specific market segment, and therefore, occupy a market place position of
competitive advantage. With that in mind, this paper argues that it could be globally optimal to encourage
national/regional IPR exhaustion where countries or groups of countries have similar demand
characteristics and transportation cost is low among countries in that region. It also argues that price
differentials should be sustained among countries where demand structure is different and procuring and
shipping costs are high.
R-A theory also emphasizes the intangible and higher order resource nature of intellectual property
rights. Therefore, protection of IPRs is essential today for invention, innovation, and the healthy
expansion of the global economic system.
The inconclusive nature of initial TRIPS negotiations through Article 6 does not conclude the debate
regarding the international exhaustion doctrine of PI. There is no reconciliation on the matter, and in most
cases it is at the status quo ante with each country or region selecting its own policy. As a result, each
member country to the agreement is free to decide how they deal with the exhaustion of IPRs by their
own national laws. This passive approach to exhaustion is preferred to an affirmative policy of requiring
exhaustion as a matter of international law. However, based on the arguments that we raised in this paper,
we believe that the status quo is unsustainable for an indefinite period of time. Some attempt at policy
harmonization in markets with similar demand characteristics may be the optimal global policy.
Therefore, based on R-A theory, we argue that liberalization of PI only among countries of similar
economic development with low transportation costs, and controlling PI between heavily and less
regulated markets may increase the social welfare at a global scale.
Vigorous competition requires institutions, laws, and regulations that promote the linkage between
innovation and rewards. Vigorous competition also requires governments to provide IPR owners the right
to control PI activities on a regional basis. Global and national policies regulating PI require ample
thought and careful implementation (Maskus, 2010). These policies should be flexible enough that if there
are any collusive pricing practices, governments should have the ability to apply their competition laws to
curb such international trade practices. Full-scale liberalization of PI at a global scale to prevent collusive
business practices is nothing but sawing off the branch we are sitting on.
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